“The Vais’e@sika sutras tacitly admit the Vedas as a prama@na.  The view that Vais’e@sika only admitted two prama@nas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, "pratyak@sameka@mcarvaka@h ka@nadasugatau puna@h anumananca taccapi, etc.”  Pras’astapada divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidya (right knowledge) and avidya (ignorance).  Under avidya he counts sa@ms’aya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya (illusion or error), anadhyavasaya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna (dream).  Right knowledge (vidya) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (ar@sa).  Interpreting the Vais’e@sika sutras I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves.  Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. Arthapatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamana (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]

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Nyaya adds a fourth, upamana (analogy).  The principle on which the four-fold division of prama@nas depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different.  The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or s’abda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and s’abda are different prama@nas, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception.  Nyaya thus objects to the incorporation of s’abda (testimony) or upamana within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different prama@nas [Footnote ref 1].

Perception (Pratyak@sa).

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.  These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed.  Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akas’a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up.  The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.  Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.  The cognitive senses (vak, pani, pada, payu, and upastha) recognized in Sa@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.