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[Footnote 1:  Govardhana’s Nyayabodhini on Tarkasa@mgraha, pp. 9, 10.]

[Footnote 2:  “Avyabhicarinimasandigdharthopalabdhi@m vidadhati bodhabodhasvabhava samagri prama@nam.” Nyayamanjari, p. 12.  Udyotakara however defined “prama@na” as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge).  This view does not go against Jayanta’s view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced.  Thus Vacaspati says:  “siddhamindriyadi, asiddhanca tatsannikar@sadi vyaparayannutpadayan kara@na eva caritartha@h kar@na@m tvindriyadi tatsannikar@sadi va nanyatra caritarthamiti sak@sadupalabdhaveva phale vyapriyate.” Tatparya@tika, p. 15.  Thus it is the action of the senses as prama@na which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. "Pramat@rprameyayo@h. pramane caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h.  Pramat@rprameye tu phaloddes’ena prav@rtte iti taddhetu kathancit.”  Ibid. p. 16.]

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the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect.  Of course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated from the collocated or combined things.  But in any case it is the preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.  These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification (vis’e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in upamana, the hearing of sound in s’abda) but also the assemblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for the origin of knowledge.  The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge.  It is this capacity of the collocations that is called prama@na.

Nyaya argues that in the Sa@mkhya view knowledge originates by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept (knowledge).  The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as it always remains in its own transcendental purity.  If the transcendental contact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance or appearance or illusion, then the Sa@mkhya has to admit that there is no real knowledge according to them.  All knowledge is false.  And since all knowledge is false, the Sa@mkhyists have precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.