giving of names to things (sa@mjnakarma).  Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us) [Footnote ref 1].  On account of the fact that movements rest only in one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of akas’a (ether).  Akas’a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality.  And this substance is akas’a.  It is a substance and eternal like air.  As being is one so akas’a is one [Footnote ref 2].

In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nada tries to prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water.  Time is defined as that which gives the notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness.  It is one like being.  Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because the notion of time is absent in eternal things.  Space supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much nearer to this.  Like being it is one.  One space appears to have diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the sun.  As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely grasped, whether rightly seen or not.  He then discusses the question whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and their object inheres.

The knowledge of sense-objects (indriyartha) is the reason by

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[Footnote 1:  I have differed from Upaskara in interpreting “sa@mjnakarma” in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while Upaskara makes it a dvandva compound.  Upaskara’s interpretation seems to be far-fetched.  He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God.]

[Footnote 2:  This interpretation is according to S’a@nkara Mis’ra’s Upaskara.]

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