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[Footnote 1: Caraka, S’arira, 39.]
[Footnote 2: See the next section.]
[Footnote 3: Vatsyayana’s Bha@sya on the Nyaya sutras, I.i.32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in Das’avaikalikaniryukti as noted before.]
[Footnote 4: Nyaya sutra I.i. 5, and Vais’e@sika sutras IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]
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heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness(sneha), elasticity (sa@mskara), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma); in one part of the sutra the enumeration begins with “para” (universality) and ends in “prayatna,” but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka’s sutra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the Vais’e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. Bha@sapariccheda (a later Vais’e@sika compendium), is a compilation from some very old karikas which are referred to by Vis’vanatha as being collected from “atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h”—(from very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka’s definition of samanya and vis’e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyaya-Vais’e@sika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vais’e@sika sutra that samanya (generality) and vi’se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka’s sutras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vais’e@sika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.
The Vais’e@sika sutras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of “I.” There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mima@msa doctrines