time as Nyaya was the same as was referred to as Anvik@siki by Kau@tilya.  He distinctly identifies Nyayavidya with Anvik@siki, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as sa@ms’aya (doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two terms prama@na (means of cognition) and prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (p@rthakprasthana) were treated, Nyayavidya would simply become metaphysics (adhyatmavidya) like the Upani@sads.  The old meaning of Nyaya as the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vatsyayana and is sanctioned by Vacaspati in his Nyayavarttikatatparya@tika I.i. 1).  He compares the meaning of the word Nyaya (prama@nairarthaparik@sa@nam—­to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word anvik@siki (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures).  Vatsyayana of course points out that so far as this logical side of Nyaya is concerned it has the widest scope for

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[Footnote 1:  Kalidasa’s Kumarasambhava “Udghato pra@navayasam nyayaistribhirudira@nam,” also Mallinatha’s gloss on it.]

[Footnote 2:  Prof.  Jacobi’s “The early history of Indian Philosophy,” Indian Antiquary, 1918.]

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itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences [Footnote ref 1].  He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyaya is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works.  In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation.  I do not dispute Prof.  Jacobi’s main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view.  In fact Vatsyayana himself designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthana (separate branch).  But I do not find that any statement of Vatsyayana or Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kau@tilya.  Vatsyayana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or adhyatmavidya was acknowledged by all.  But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people.  None of the dharmas’astras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vatsyayana had to seek the support of Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource.  The fact that Kau@tilya was not satisfied by counting Anvik@siki as one of the four vidyas but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Sa@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kau@tilya’s time Nyaya was composed of two branches, one as adhyatmavidya and another as a science