A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.

A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.
necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous.  Change means the rise of new qualities.  It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state.  The second, is the difference between Vacaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual process.  Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vacaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate.  With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics.  Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vacaspati’s commentary on the Sa@mkhya karika which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (aha@mkara) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it.  There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmatras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of Vyasabha@sya and Vijnana Bhik@su etc.  Vacaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkara and

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from aha@mkara the tanmatras [Footnote ref 1].  Vijnana Bhik@su however holds that both the separation of aha@mkara and the evolution of the tanmatras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation.  There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vacaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical importance.

Yoga and Patanjali.

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like.  The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the S’atapatha Brahmana and the B@rhadara@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2].  The word has another derivative “yugya” in later Sanskrit literature [Footnote ref 3].

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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.