Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some time and do not happen at other times are regarded as “effects.”  But the world as a whole exists always.  If it is argued that things contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are “effects,” then that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these are contained in him.  He also becomes a created being by virtue of that.  And even atoms would be “effects,” for they also undergo changes of colour by heat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a whole is an “effect.”  And every effect has a cause, and so the world as a whole has a cause.  But this does not mean that the cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be.  If it is argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human beings.  If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference.  Because water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke.  If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced by intelligent agents.  For these are also effects of which we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases.  If it is said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have a vicious circle (anyonyas’raya).

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Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have never seen any intelligent creator without a body.  If it is held that we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind of body.  If you take the instances with some kind of effects such as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them.  If it is said that these are also made by God, then you have an argument in a circle (cakraka), for this was the very matter which you sought to prove.