with Brahmins), (6) Vipak@sa prati@sedha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) D@r@s@anta (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) As’a@nka (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) As’a@nkaprati@sedha_ (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigamana (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhu@sa@na’s Indian Logic).  These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant.  When Vatsyayana in his Nyayasutrabha@sya, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]

[Footnote 2:  See Jainatarkavarttika, and Parik@samukhasutrav@rtti, and _@Sa@ddars’anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]

187

which could not non-existent.  In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being).  Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment.  All things were thus momentary.  The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience.  When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground.  This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change.  How in the face of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment?  Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence associated with change—­paryaya (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones).  The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint (naya) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view