A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.

A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as:  (1) “the hill is fiery,” (2) “because of smoke,” (3) “wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen,” (4) “this hill is smoky,” (5) “therefore it is fiery,” called respectively pratijna, hetu, drs@tanta, upanaya and nigamana, except for the purpose of explicitness.  It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (Prameyakamalamarta@n@da, pp. 108, 109).  When we make an

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[Footnote 1 Prameyakamalamarta@n@da, pp. 8-11.]

186

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above.  They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhava) or as invariable antecedence (kramabhava) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire.  A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference [Footnote ref 1].

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance [Footnote ref 2].

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.  That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

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[Footnote 1:  As regards concomitance (vyapti) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer antarvyapti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire).  They also divide inference into two classes, svarthanumana for one’s own self and pararthanumana for convincing others.  It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his Das’avaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) Pratijna (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijnavibhakti (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) Vipak@sa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case

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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.