and this justifies us in saying that “may be that in some sense the jug is,” and “may be in some sense that the jug is not.”  Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense “may be that the jug is,” and in some sense “may be that the jug is not.”  We understood here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics constituting being, we may say “the jug is,” but if we put emphasis on the other side, we may as well say “the jug is not.”  Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either side.  But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable—­avaktavya, for how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it.  Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite.  Combining these four again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.  Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called saptabha@ngi holds good [Footnote ref 1].  The Jains say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

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[Footnote 1:  See Syadvadamanjari, with Hemacandra’s commentary, pp. 166, etc.]

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point of view.  They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (upadhi).  It is thus impossible to make any affirmation which is universally and absolutely valid.  For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other.  As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid.  Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment.  There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally.  The relation of the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by