to a past and different object with the object as perceived at the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1].  This is true not only of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment.  But since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot be proved by a confusion of the two.  Every moment all objects of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed.  Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave the impression as if the old ones were persisting.  So it is that though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been persisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2].  Just as the flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.

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[Footnote 1:  See pratyabhijnanirasa of the Buddhists, Nyayamanjari, V.S.  Series, pp. 449, etc.]

[Footnote 2:  See Tarkarahasyadipika of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also Nyayamanjari, V.S. edition, p. 450.]

163

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine
of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse characteristics [Footnote ref 1].  What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies.  So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same.  As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2].  Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence