It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the Kathavatthu (200 B.C.).  Thus Aung on the evidence of the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As’oka “was conversant with the distribution of terms” and the process of conversion.  He further points out that the logical premisses such as the udahara@na (Yo yo aggima so so dhumava—­whatever is fiery is smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dhumava—­this hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmadayam aggima—­therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the Kathavatthu as follows: 

“Adherent.  Is A B? (_@thapana_). 
Opponent.  Yes.

Adherent.  Is C D? (papana). 
Opponent.  No.

Adherent.  But if A be B then (you should have said) C is D. 
That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false. 
Hence your first answer is refuted.”)

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thapana, because the opponent’s position, A is B, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed papana because it is got from the antecedent.  And the conclusion

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is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the opponent.  Next: 

“If D be derived of C.  Then B should have been derived of A.  But you affirmed B of A. (therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or C is wrong.”

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma.  In both methods the consequent is derived.  But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get

  “If A is B C is D. 
  But A is B. 
  Therefore C is D.

By this indirect method the opponent’s second answer is reestablished [Footnote ref 1].”

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (anvayavyapti), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative.  Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (arthakriyakaritva).  The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus:  “Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which