nature of the genus, one could infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tadatmya).  The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect which stands as the reason of the former.  Thus from the smoke the fire which has produced it may be inferred.  The ground of these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (svabhavapratibandha), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1].  The svabhavapratibandha determines the inseparability of connection (avinabhavaniyama) and the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection [Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as pararthanumana agrees with svarthanumana in all essential characteristics; the main difference between the two is this, that in the case of pararthanumana, the inferential process has to be put verbally in premisses.

Pandit Ratnakarasanti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyaptisamarthana in which

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[Footnote 1:  na hi yo yatra svabhavena na pratibaddha@h sa tam apratibaddhavi@sayamavs’yameva na vyabhicaratiti nasti tayoravyabhicaraniyama.  Nyayabindu@tika, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2:  The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa—­the thing about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in those cases where the sadhya oc probandum existed), and (3) vipak@sasattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist).  The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g.  The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.]

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he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire.  This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyapti), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing li@nga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer concomitance (bahirvyapti) and generally accepted by the Nyaya school of thought.  This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.