But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what is then the nirva@na which is described as the final extinction of all afflictions (kles’a)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does not agree to such a definition of nirva@na. Nirva@na on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anntpannam}. In nirva@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirva@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirva@na cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (bhava), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes (sa@msk@rta) and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be determined as existent or non-existent. Nirva@na is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapancaprav@rtti). It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena (na caprav@rttimatram bhavabhaveti parikalpitum paryyate evam na bhavabhavanirva@nam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].
It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like the mirage, the dream, the maya, and the magic without any real nature (ni@hsvabhava). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that
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[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 194.]
[Footnote 3: Ibid. pp.162 and 201.]
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one is trying to win a real nirva@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidya. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (avidya), there would have been no conformations (sa@mskaras), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance “I am generating the sa@mskaras,” and it can be said of the sa@mskaras “we are being produced by the avidya.” But there being avidya, there come the sa@mskaras and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratityasamutpada is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (hetupanibandha).