A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.

A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 756 pages of information about A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvastivadins, for they maintain universal existence.  But the Vaibha@sika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra.  For Dharmatrata’s

_______________________________________________________
____________

[Footnote 1:  Gu@naratna’s Tarkarahasyadipika, pp. 46-47.]

116

view is only a veiled Sa@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them.  The Vaibha@sika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra’s view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present.  He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time.  The Sautrantika however thought that the Vaibha@sika’s doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it.  The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance.  Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist.  He objected to the Vaibha@sika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency.  If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite.  We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency.  If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable.  Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same.  When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present.  We are

117

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibha@sika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Copyrights
Project Gutenberg
A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.