of all, to take on the condition of poverty; while the state of mystic contemplation remains as a still higher goal for the few.  ALBERT THE GREAT (1193-1280), the most learned and complete commentator of Aristotle that had yet appeared, divide the whole subject of Ethics into Monastica, Oeconomica, and Politica.  In this division, which is plainly suggested by the Aristotelian division of Politics in the large sense, the term Monastica not inaptly expresses the reference that Ethics has to the conduct of men as individuals.  Albert, however, in commenting on the Nicomachean Ethics, adds exceedingly little to the results of his author beyond the incorporation of a few Scriptural ideas.  To the cardinal virtues he appends the virtutes adjunctae, Faith, Hope, and Charity, and again in his compendious work, Summa Theologiae, distinguishes them as infusae, the cardinal being considered as acquisitae.

Besides his commentaries on the Aristotelian works (the Ethics included) and many other writings, THOMAS AQUINAS (1226-74) left two large works, the Summa philosophica and the famous Summa Theologiae.  Notwithstanding the prominence assigned to theological questions, the first is a regular philosophical work; the second, though containing the exposition of philosophical opinions, is a theological textbook.  Now, as it is in the Summary for theological purposes that the whole practical philosophy of Aquinas is contained, it is to be inferred that he regarded the subject of Ethics as not on the same level with other departments of philosophy.  Moreover, even when he is not appealing to Scripture, he is seen to display what is for him a most unusual tendency to desert Aristotle, at the really critical moments, for Plato or Plotinus, or any other authority of a more theological cast.

In the (unfinished) Summa Theologiae, the Ethical views and cognate questions occupy the two sections of the second part—­the so-called prima and secunda secundae.  He begins, in the Aristotelian fashion, by seeking an ultimate end of human action, and finds it in the attainment of the highest good or happiness.  But as no created thing can answer to the idea of the highest good, it must be placed in God.  God, however, as the highest good, can only be the object, in the search after human happiness, for happiness in itself is a state of the mind or act of the soul.  The question then arises, “what sort of act?” Does it fall under the Will or under the Intelligence?  The answer is, Not under the will, because happiness is neither desire nor pleasure, but consecutio, that is, a possessing.  Desire precedes consecutio, and pleasure follows upon it; but the act of getting possession, in which lies happiness, is distinct from both.  This is illustrated by the case of the miser having his happiness in the mere possession of money; and the position is essentially the same as Butler’s, in regard to our appetites and desires, that they blindly seek their objects with no regard to pleasure.  Thomas concludes that the consecutio, or happiness, is an act of the intelligence; what pleasure there is being a mere accidental accompaniment.