These theological views were placed by Epicurus in the foreground of his ethical philosophy, as the only means of dispelling those fears of the gods that the current fables instilled into every one, and that did so much to destroy human comfort and security.  He proclaimed that beings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others—­neither showed anger nor favour to particular persons.  The doctrine that they were the working managers in the affairs of the Cosmos, celestial and terrestrial, human and extra-human, he not only repudiated as incompatible with their attributes, but declared to be impious, considering the disorder, sufferings, and violence, everywhere visible.  He disallowed all prophecy, divination, and oracular inspiration, by which the public around him believed that the gods were perpetually communicating special revelations to individuals, and for which Sokrates had felt so peculiarly thankful.[15]

It is remarkable that Stoics and Epicureans, in spite of their marked opposition in dogma or theory, agreed so far in practical results, that both declared these two modes of uneasiness (fear of the gods and fear of death) to be the great torments of human existence, and both strove to remove or counterbalance them.

So far, the teaching of Epicurus appears confined to the separate happiness of each individual, as dependent upon his own prudence, sobriety, and correct views of Nature.  But this is not the whole of the Epicurean Ethics.  The system also considered each man as in companionship with others; The precepts were shaped accordingly, first as to Justice, next as to Friendship.  In both these, the foundation whereon Epicurus built was Reciprocity:  not pure sacrifice to others, but partnership with others, beneficial to all.  He kept the ideas of self and of others inseparably knit together in one complex association:  he did not expel or degrade either, in order to give exclusive ascendancy to the other.  The dictate of Natural Justice was that no man should hurt another:  each was bound to abstain from doing harm to others; each, on this condition, was entitled to count on security and relief from the fear that others would do harm to him.  Such double aspect, or reciprocity, was essential to social companionship:  those that could not, or would not, accept this covenant, were unfit for society.  If a man does not behave justly towards others, he cannot expect that they will behave justly towards him; to live a life of injustice, and expect that others will not find it out, is idle.  The unjust man cannot enjoy a moment of security.  Epicurus laid it down explicitly, that just and righteous dealing was the indispensable condition to every one’s comfort, and was the best means of attaining it.