Next, yet only second, come the other branches of excellence:  the active social life of a good citizen.  Exercises according to this branch of virtue are the natural business of man, for it is bound up with our whole nature, including body as well as mind, our appetites, and our passions, whereas the happiness of intellect is separate.  Active social virtue postulates conditions of society and external aids in considerable measure; but the life of intellect requires only the minimum of these, and is even impeded by much of them.

That perfect happiness is to be found in the philosophical life only, will appear farther when we recollect that the gods are blest and happy in the highest degree, and that this is the only mode of life suitable to them.  With the gods there can be no scope for active social virtues; for in what way can they be just, courageous, or temperate?  Neither virtuous practice nor constructive art can be predicated of the gods; what then remains, since we all assume them to live, and therefore to be in act or exercise of some kind; for no one believes them to live in a state of sleep, like Endymion.  There remains nothing except philosophical contemplation.  This, then, must be the life of the gods, the most blest of all; and that mode of human life which approaches nearest to it will be the happiest.  No other animal can take part in this, and therefore none can be happy.  In so far as the gods pay attention to human affairs, they are likely to take pleasure in the philosopher, who is most allied to themselves.  A moderate supply of good health, food, and social position, must undoubtedly be ensured to the philosopher; for, without these, human nature will not suffice for the business of contemplation.  But he will demand nothing more than a moderate supply, and when thus equipped, he will approach nearer to happiness than any one else.  Aristotle declares this confidently, citing Solon, Anaxagoras, and other sages, as having said much the same before him (VIII.).

In the concluding chapter, Aristotle gives the transition from Ethics to Politics.  Treatises on virtue may inspire a few liberal minds; but, for the mass of men, laws, institutions, and education are necessary.  The young ought to be trained, not merely by paternal guidance directing in the earliest years their love and hatred, but also by a scheme of public education, prescribed and enforced by authority throughout the city.  Right conduct will thus be rendered easier by habit; but still, throughout life, the mature citizen must continue under the discipline of law, which has force adequate to correction, and, being impersonal, does not excite aversion and hatred.  Hence the need for a system of good public training.  Nowhere is this now established and enforced; hardly anywhere, except in Sparta, is it even attempted.  Amid such public neglect, it becomes the duty of an individual to contribute what he can to the improvement of those that he is concerned in, and for that purpose to acquire