So far the theory of Pleasure.  Aristotle now goes back to his starting point—­the nature of the Good, and Happiness.  He re-states his positions:  That Happiness is an exercise or actuality [Greek:  energeia], and not an acquirement or state (hexis), That it belongs to such exercises as are worthy of choice for their own sake, and not to such as are worthy of choice for the sake of something else; That it is perfect and self-sufficing, seeking nothing beyond itself, and leaving no wants unsupplied.  Hence he had concluded that it consisted in acting according to virtue; for the honourable and good are chosen for their own sake.  But amusements are also sought for their own sake; Are these also to be called happiness?  No.  It is true that they are much pursued by those whom the vulgar envy—­men of wealth and despots—­who patronize and reward the practitioners of amusement.  But this proves nothing, for we cannot adopt the choice of these despots, who have little virtue or intellect, and have never known the taste of refined and liberal pleasure.  Children and mature men, bad men and virtuous, have each their different pleasures; the virtuous and intelligent man finds a life of excellence and the pleasures attached thereunto most worthy of his choice, and such a man (Aristotle has declared more than once) is our standard.  It would indeed be childish to treat amusements as the main end of life; they are the relaxation of the virtuous man, who derives from them fresh vigour for the prosecution of the serious business of life, which he cannot prosecute continuously.  The serious exercises of life are better than the comic, because they proceed from the better part of man.  The slave may enjoy bodily pleasures to the full, but a slave is not called happy (VI.).

We have thus shown that Happiness consists in exercise or actual living according to excellence; naturally, therefore, according to the highest excellence, or the excellence of the best part of man.  This best part is the Intellect (Nous), our most divine and commanding element; in its exercise, which is theoretical or speculative, having respect to matters honourable, divine, and most worthy of study.  Such philosophical exercise, besides being the highest function of our nature, is at the same time more susceptible than any mode of active effort, of being prosecuted for a long continuance.  It affords the purest and most lasting pleasure; it approaches most nearly to being self-sufficing, since it postulates little more than the necessaries of life, and is even independent of society, though better with society.  Perfect happiness would thus be the exercise of the theorizing intellect, continued through a full period of life.  But this is more than we can expect.  Still, we ought to make every effort to live according to this best element of our nature; for, though small in bulk, it stands exalted above the rest in power and dignity, and, being the sovereign element in man, is really The Man himself (VII.).