denies.  Pleasure is not a motion; for the attribute of velocity, greater or less, which is essential to all motion, does not attach to pleasure.  A man may be quick in becoming pleased, or in becoming angry; but in the act of being pleased or angry, he can neither be quick nor slow.  Nor is it true that pleasure is a generation.  In all generation, there is something assignable out of which generation takes place (not any one thing out of any other), and into which it reverts by destruction.  If pleasure be a generation, pain must be the destruction of what is generated; but this is not correct, for pain does not re-establish the state antecedent to the pleasure.  Accordingly, it is not true that pleasure is a generation.  Some talk of pain as a want of something required by nature, and of pleasure as a filling up of that want.  But these are corporeal, not mental facts, and are applicable only to eating and drinking; not applicable to many other pleasures, such as those of sight, hearing, or learning. (4) There are some disgraceful pleasures.  Aristotle replies that these are not absolutely and properly pleasures, but only to the depraved man; just as things are not yellow, which appear so to men in a jaundice.  Pleasures differ from each other in species:  there are good pleasures, i.e., those arising from good sources; and bad pleasures, i.e., from bad sources.  The pleasure per se is always desirable; but not when it comes from objectionable acts.  The pleasures of each man will vary according to his character; none but a musical man can enjoy the pleasures of music.  No one would consent to remain a child for life, even though he were to have his fill of childish pleasure.

Aristotle sums up the result thus.  Pleasure is not The Good.  Not every mode of pleasure is to be chosen.  Some pleasures, distinguished from the rest specifically or according to their sources, are to be chosen per se (III.).

He then attempts to define pleasure.  It is something perfect and complete in itself, at each successive moment of time; hence it is not motion, which is at every moment incomplete.  Pleasure is like the act of vision, or a point, or a monad, always complete in itself.  It accompanies every variety of sensible perception, intelligence, and theorizing contemplation.  In each of these faculties, the act is more perfect, according as the subjective element is most perfect, and the object most grand and dignified.  When the act is most perfect, the pleasure accompanying it is also the most perfect; and this pleasure puts the finishing consummation to the act.  The pleasure is not a pre-existing acquirement now brought into exercise, but an accessory end implicated with the act, like the fresh look which belongs to the organism just matured.  It is a sure adjunct, so long as subject and object are in good condition.  But continuity of pleasure, as well as of the other exercises, is impossible.  Life is itself an exercise much