in him, but it is overcome when he does wrong, and he afterwards repents (VIII.).  Here, again, Aristotle denies that sticking to one’s opinions is, per se, continence.  The opinion may be wrong; in that case, if a man sticks to it, prompted by mere self-assertion and love of victory, it is a species of incontinence.  One of the virtues of the continent man is to be open to persuasion, and to desert one’s resolutions for a noble end (IX.).  Incontinence is like sleep or drunkenness as opposed to wakeful knowledge.  The incontinent man is like a state having good laws, but not acting on them.  The incontinence of passion is more curable than that of weakness; what proceeds from habit more than what is natural (X.).

The Eighth and Ninth Books contain the treatise on Friendship.

The subject deserves a place in an Ethical treatise, because of its connexion with virtue and with happiness.  Several questions have been debated concerning Friendship,—­Is it based on likeness or unlikeness?  Can bad men be friends?  Is there but one species of Friendship, or more than one? (I.) Some progress towards a solution of these questions may be made by considering what are the objects of liking; these are the good, the pleasant, the useful.  By the good is not meant the absolute good of Plato, but the apparent good.  Inanimate things must be excluded, as wanting reciprocation (II.).  The varieties of friendship follow these three modes of the likeable.  The friendships for the useful and the pleasant, are not disinterested, but self-seeking; they are therefore accidental and transitory; they do not involve intimate and frequent association.  Friendship for the good, and between the virtuous, is alone perfect; it is formed slowly, and has the requisites of permanence.  It occurs rarely (III.).  As regards the useful and the pleasant, the bad may be friends.  It may happen that two persons are mutually pleasant to each other, as lover and beloved; while this lasts, there is friendship.  It is only as respects the good, that there exists a permanent liking for the person.  Such friendship is of an absolute nature; the others are accidental (IV.).  Friendship is in full exercise only during actual intercourse; it may exist potentially at a distance; but in long absence, there is danger of its being dissolved.  Friendship is a settled state or habit, while fondness is a mere passion, which does not imply our wishing to do good to the object of it, as friendship does (V.).  The perfect kind of friendship, from its intensity, cannot be exercised towards more than a small number.  In regard to the useful and the pleasant, on the other hand, there may be friendship with many; as the friendship towards tradesmen and between the young.  The happy desire pleasant friends.  Men in power have two classes of friends; one for the useful, the other for the pleasant.  Both qualities are found in the good man; but he will not be the friend of a superior, unless he be surpassed