Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 487 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 487 pages of information about Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics.

The third point, the only question of real interest or difficulty, is resumed at greater length.  The distinction between knowledge and opinion (the higher and the lower kinds of knowledge) does not settle the question, for opinion may be as strong as knowledge.  The real point is, what is meant by having knowledge?  A man’s knowledge may be in abeyance, as it is when he is asleep or intoxicated.  Thus, we may have in the mind two knowledges (like two separate syllogisms), one leading to continence, the other to incontinence; the first is not drawn out, like the syllogism wanting a minor; hence it may be said to be not present to the mind; so that, in a certain sense, Sokrates was right in denying that actual and present knowledge could be overborne.  Vice is a form of oblivion (III.).

The next question is, what is the object-matter of incontinence; whether there is any man incontinent simply and absolutely (without any specification of wherein), or whether all incontinent men are so in regard to this or that particular matter? (No. 6).  The answer is, that it applies directly to the bodily appetites and pleasures, which are necessary up to a certain point (the sphere of Temperance), and then he that commits unreasonable excess above this point is called Incontinent simply.  But if he commits excess in regard to pleasures, which, though not necessary, are natural and, up to a certain point, reasonable—­such as victory, wealth, honour—­we designate him as incontinent, yet with a specification of the particular matter (IV.).

The modes of Bestiality, as cannibalism and unnatural passion, are ascribed to morbid depravity of nature or of habits, analogous to disease or madness (V.).

Incontinence in anger is not so bad as Incontinence in lust, because anger (1) has more semblance of reason, (2) is more a matter of constitution, (3) has less of deliberate purpose—­while lust is crafty, (4) arises under pain; and not from wantonness (VI.).

Persons below the average in resisting pleasures are incontinent; those below the average in resisting pains are soft or effeminate.  The mass of men incline to both weaknesses.  He that deliberately pursues excessive pleasures, or other pleasures in an excessive way, is said to be abandoned.  The intemperate are worse than the incontinent.  Sport, in its excess, is effeminacy, as being relaxation from toil.  There are two kinds of incontinence:  the one proceeding from precipitancy, where a man acts without deliberating at all; the other from feebleness,—­where he deliberates, but where the result of deliberation is too weak to countervail his appetite (VII.).  Intemperance or profligacy is more vicious, and less curable than Incontinence.  The profligate man is one who has in him no principle (archae) of good or of right reason, and who does wrong without afterwards repenting of it; the incontinent man has the good principle

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Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.