in the stricter sense of the word, concerns more especially the individual self; still, the welfare of the individual is perhaps inseparable from household and state concerns.  Prudence farther implies a large experience; whence boys, who can become good mathematicians, cannot have practical judgment or prudence.  In consultation, we are liable to error both in regard to universals, and in regard to particulars; it is the business of prudence, as well as of the political science, to guard against both.  That prudence is not identical with Science, is plain enough; for Science is the intermediate process between the first principles and the last conclusions; whereas prudence consists chiefly in seizing these last, which are the applications of reasoning, and represent the particular acts to be done.  Prudence is the counterpart of Reason [Greek:  Nous] or Intellect, but at the opposite extremity of the mental process.  For Intellect [Greek:  Nous] apprehends the extreme Universals,—­the first principles,—­themselves not deducible, but from which deduction starts; while Prudence fastens on the extreme particulars, which are not known by Science, but by sensible Perception.  We mean here by sensible Perception, not what is peculiar to any of the five senses, but what is common to them all—­whereby we perceive that the triangle before us is a geometrical ultimatum, and that it is the final subject of application for all the properties previously demonstrated to belong to triangles generally.  The mind will stop here in the downward march towards practical application, as it stopped at first principles in the upward march.  Prudence becomes, however, confounded with sensible perception, when we reach this stage. [The statement here given involves Aristotle’s distinction of the proper and the common Sensibles; a shadowing out of the muscular element in sensation] (VIII.).

Good counsel [Greek:  euboulia] is distinguished from various other qualities.  It is, in substance, choosing right means to a good end; the end being determined by the great faculty—­Prudence or Judiciousness (IX.).  Sagacity [Greek:  synesis] is a just intellectual measure in regard to the business of life, individual and social; critical ability in appreciating and interpreting the phenomena of experience.  It is distinguished from Prudence in this respect—­that Prudence carries inferences into Practice (X.).  Considerateness [Greek:  gnomae] is another intellectual virtue, with a practical bearing.  It is that virtue whereby we discern the proper occasions for indulgent construction, softening the rigour of logical consistency.  It is the source of equitable decisions.