Prudence or Judiciousness [Greek:  phronaesis], the quality of [Greek:  ho phronimos], the Practical Reason, comes next.  We are told what are the matters wherewith it is, and wherewith it is not, conversant.  It does not deal with matters wherein there exist art, or with rules of art.  It does not deal with necessary matters, nor with matters not modifiable by human agency.  The prudent or judicious man is one who (like Pericles) can accurately estimate and foresee matters (apart from Science and Art) such as are good or evil for himself and other human beings.  On these matters, feelings of pleasure or pain are apt to bias the mind, by insinuating wrong aims; which they do not do in regard to the properties of a triangle and other scientific conclusions.  To guard against such bias, the judicious man must be armed with the ethical excellence described above as Temperance or Moderation.  Judiciousness is not an Art, admitting of better and worse; there are not good judicious men, and bad judicious men, as there are good and bad artists.  Judiciousness is itself an excellence (i.e., the term connotes excellence)—­an excellence of the rational soul, and of that branch of the rational soul which is calculating, deliberative, not scientific (V.).  Reason or Intellect [Greek:  nous] is the faculty for apprehending the first principles of demonstrative science.  It is among the infallible faculties of the mind, together with Judiciousness, Science, and Philosophy.  Each of these terms connotes truth and accuracy (VI.).  Wisdom in the arts is the privilege of the superlative artists, such as Phidias in sculpture.  But there are some men wise, not in any special art, but absolutely; and this wisdom [Greek:  sophia] is Philosophy.  It embraces both principles of science (which Aristotle considers to come under the review of the First Philosophy) and deductions therefrom; it is [Greek:  nous] and [Greek:  epistaemae] in one.  It is more venerable and dignified than Prudence or Judiciousness; because its objects, the Kosmos and the celestial bodies, are far more glorious than man, with whose interests alone Prudence is concerned; and also because the celestial objects are eternal and unvarying; while man and his affairs are transitory and ever fluctuating.  Hence the great honour paid to Thales, Anaxagoras, and others, who speculated on theories thus magnificent and superhuman, though useless in respect to human good.

We have already said that Prudence or Judiciousness is good counsel on human interests, with a view to action.  But we must also add that it comprises a knowledge not of universals merely, but also of particulars; and experienced men, much conversant with particulars, are often better qualified for action than inexperienced men of science (VII.).  Prudence is the same in its intellectual basis as the political science or art—­yet looked at in a different aspect.  Both of them are practical and consultative, respecting matters of human good and evil; but prudence,