In one part of his argument, however, where he maintains that vice must be voluntary, because its opposite, virtue, is voluntary, he is already touching on the magical island of the bad enchantress; allowing a question of fact to be swayed by the notion of factitious dignity.  Virtue is assumed to be voluntary, not on the evidence of fact, but because there would be an indignity cast on it, to suppose otherwise.  Now, this consideration, which Aristotle gives way to on various occasions, is the motive underlying the objectionable metaphor.

After the preceding digression on the Voluntary and Involuntary, Aristotle takes up the consideration of the Virtues in order, beginning with COURAGE, which was one of the received cardinal virtues, and a subject of frequent discussion. (Plato, Laches, Protagoras, Republic, &c.)

Courage [Greek:  andreia], the mean between timidity and foolhardiness, has to do with evils.  All evils are objects of fear; but there are some evils that even the brave man does right to fear—­as disgrace.  Poverty or disease he ought not to fear.  Yet, he will not acquire the reputation of courage from not fearing these, nor will he acquire it if he be exempt from fear when about to be scourged.  Again, if a man be afraid of envy from others, or of insults to his children or wife, he will not for that reason be regarded as a coward.  It is by being superior to the fear of great evils, that a man is extolled as courageous; and the greatest of evils is death, since it is a final close, as well of good as of evil.  Hence the dangers of war are the greatest occasion of courage.  But the cause must be honourable (VI.).

Thus the key to true courage is the quality or merit of the action.  That man is brave, who both fears, and affronts without fear, what he ought and when he ought:  who suffers and acts according to the value of the cause, and according to a right judgment of it.  The opposites or extremes of courage include (1) Deficiency of fear; (2) Excess of fear, cowardice; (3) Deficiency of daring, another formula for cowardice; (4) Excess of daring, Rashness.  Between these, Courage is the mean (VII.).

Aristotle enumerates five analogous forms of quasi-courage, approaching more or less to genuine courage. (1) The first, most like to the true, is political courage, which is moved to encounter danger by the Punishments and the Honours of society.  The desire of honour rises to virtue, and is a noble spring of action. (2) A second kind is the effect of Experience, which dispels seeming terrors, and gives skill to meet real danger. (3) Anger, Spirit, Energy [Greek:  thymos] is a species of courage, founded on physical power and excitement, but not under the guidance of high emotions. (4) The Sanguine temperament, by overrating the chances of success, gives courage. (5) Lastly, Ignorance of the danger may have the same effect as courage (VIII.).

Courage is mainly connected with pain and loss.  Men are called brave for the endurance of pain, even although it bring pleasure in the end, as to the boxer who endures bruises from the hope of honour.  Death is painful, and most so to the man that by his virtue has made life valuable.  Such a man is to be considered more courageous, as a soldier, than a mercenary with little to lose (IX.).