In his love of subtle distinctions, he asks, Is happiness a thing admirable in itself, or a thing praiseworthy?  It is admirable in itself; for what is praiseworthy has a relative character, and is praised as conducive to some ulterior end; while the chief good must be an End in itself, for the sake of which everything else is done (XII.). [This is a defective recognition of Relativity.]

Having assumed as one of the items of his definition, that man’s happiness must be in his special or characteristic work, performed with perfect excellence,—­Aristotle now proceeds to settle wherein that excellence consists.  This leads to a classification of the parts of the soul.  The first distribution is, into Rational and Irrational; whether these two are separable in fact, or only logically separable (like concave and convex), is immaterial to the present enquiry.  Of the irrational, the lowest portion is the Vegetative [Greek:  phytikon], which seems most active in sleep; a state where bad men and good are on a par, and which is incapable of any human excellence.  The next portion is the Appetitive [Greek:  epithymaetikon], which is not thus incapable.  It partakes of reason, yet it includes something conflicting with reason.  These conflicting tendencies are usually modifiable by reason, and may become in the temperate man completely obedient to reason.  There remains Reason—­the highest and sovereign portion of the soul.  Human excellence [Greek:  aretae] or virtue, is either of the Appetitive part,—­moral [Greek:  aethikae] virtue; or of the Reason—­intellectual [Greek:  dianoaetikae] virtue.  Liberality and temperance are Moral virtues; philosophy, intelligence, and wisdom, Intellectual (XIII.).

Such is an outline of the First Book, having for its subject the Chief Good, the Supreme End of man.

Book Second embraces the consideration of points relative to the Moral Virtues; it also commences Aristotle’s celebrated definition and classification of the virtues or excellencies.

Whereas intellectual excellence is chiefly generated and improved by teaching, moral excellence is a result of habit [Greek:  ethos]; whence its name (Ethical).  Hence we may see that moral excellence is no inherent part of our nature:  if it were, it could not be reversed by habit—­any more than a stone can acquire from any number of repetitions the habit of moving upward, or fire the habit of moving downward.  These moral excellencies are neither a part of our nature, nor yet contrary to our nature:  we are by nature fitted to take them on, but they are brought to consummation through habit.  It is not with them, as with our senses, where nature first gives us the power to see and hear, and where we afterwards exercise that power.  Moral virtues are acquired only by practice.  We learn to build or to play the harp, by building or playing the harp:  so too we become just or courageous, by a course of just or courageous acts.  This is attested by all lawgivers