equivalent to ‘living well and doing well,’ another definition; consisting in virtue (the Cynics); in practical wisdom—­[Greek:  phronaesis] (Sokrates); in philosophy; or in all these coupled with pleasure (Plato, in the Philebus).  Agreeing with those who insisted on virtue, Aristotle considers his own theory an improvement, by requiring virtue in act, and not simply in possession.  Moreover, he contends that to the virtuous man, virtuous performance is in itself pleasurable; so that no extraneous source of pleasure is needed.  Such (he says) is the judgment of the truly excellent man; which must be taken as conclusive respecting the happiness, as well as the honourable pre-eminence of the best mental exercises.  Nevertheless, he admits (so far complying with the Cyrenaics) that some extraneous conditions cannot be dispensed with; the virtuous man can hardly exhibit his virtue in act, without some aid from friends and property; nor can he be happy if his person is disgusting to behold or his parentage vile (VIII.).

This last admission opens the door to those that place good fortune in the same line with happiness, and raises the question, how happiness is attained.  By teaching?  By habitual exercise?  By divine grace?  By Fortune?  If there be any gift vouchsafed by divine grace to man, it ought to be this; but whether such be the case or not, it is at any rate the most divine and best of all acquisitions.  To ascribe such an acquisition as this to Fortune would be absurd.  Nature, which always aims at the best, provides that it shall be attained, through a certain course of teaching and training, by all who are not physically or mentally disqualified.  It thus falls within the scope of political science, whose object is to impart the best character and active habits to the citizens.  It is with good reason that we never call a horse happy, for he can never reach such an attainment; nor indeed can a child be so called while yet a child, for the same reason; though in his case we may hope for the future, presuming on a full term of life, as was before postulated (IX.).  But-this long term allows room for extreme calamities and change in a man’s lot.  Are we then to say, with Solon, that no one can be called happy so long as he lives? or that the same man may often pass backwards and forwards from happiness to misery?  No; this only shows the mistake of resting happiness upon so unsound a basis as external fortune.  The only true basis of it is the active manifestation of mental excellence, which no ill fortune can efface from a man’s mind (X.).  Such a man will bear calamity, if it comes, with dignity, and can never be made thoroughly miserable.  If he be moderately supplied as to external circumstances, he is to be styled happy; that is, happy as a man—­as far as man can reasonably expect.  Even after his decease he-will be affected, yet only feebly affected, by the good or ill fortune of his surviving children.  Aristotle evidently assigns little or no value to presumed posthumous happiness (XI.).