7.  Thirdly, Moral right and wrong is not so much a simple, indivisible property, as an extensive Code of regulations, which cannot even be understood without a certain maturity of the intelligence.

If is not possible to sum up the whole field of moral right and wrong, so as to bring it within the scope of a single limited perception, like the perception of resistance, or of colour.  In regard to some of the alleged intuitions at the foundation of our knowledge, as for example time and space, there is a comparative simplicity and unity, rendering their innate origin less disputable.  No such simplicity can be assigned in the region of duty.

After the subject of morals has been studied in the detail, it has, indeed, been found practicable to comprise the whole, by a kind of generalization, in one comprehensive recognition of regard to our fellows.  But, in the first place, this is far from a primitive or an intuitive suggestion of the mind.  It came at a late stage of human history, and is even regarded as a part of Revelation.  In the second place, this high generality must be accompanied with detailed applications to particular cases and circumstances.  Life is full of conflicting demands, and there must be special rules to adjust these various demands.  We have to be told that country is greater than family; that temporary interests are to succumb to more enduring, and so on.

Supposing the Love of our Neighbour to unfold in detail, as it expresses in sum, the whole of morality, this is only another name for our Sympathetic, Benevolent, or Disinterested regards, into which therefore Conscience would be resolved, as it was by Hume.

But Morals is properly considered as a wide-ranging science, having a variety of heads full of difficulty, and demanding minute consideration.  The subject of Justice, has nothing simple but the abstract statement—­giving each one their due; before that can be applied, we must ascertain what is each person’s due, which introduces complex questions of relative merit, far transcending the sphere of intuition.

If any part of Morals had the simplicity of an instinct, it would be regard to Truth.  The difference between truth and falsehood might almost be regarded as a primitive susceptibility, like the difference between light and dark, between resistance and non-resistance.  That each person should say what is, instead of what is not, may well seem a primitive and natural impulse.  In circumstances of perfect indifference, this would be the obvious and usual course of conduct; being, like the straight line, the shortest distance between two points.  Let a motive arise, however, in favour of the lie, and there is nothing to insure the truth.  Reference must be made to other parts of the mind, from which counter-motives may be furnished; and the intuition in favour of Truth, not being able to support itself, has to repose on the general foundation of all virtue, the instituted recognition of the claims of others.