To sum up.  The great distinction between, the Just and the Expedient is the distinction between the essentials of well-being—­the moral rules forbidding mankind to hurt one another—­and the rules that only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs.  It is in the higher moralities of protection from harm that each individual has the greatest stake; and they are the moralities that compose the obligations of justice.  It is on account of these that punishment, or retribution of evil for evil, is universally included in the idea.  For the carrying out of the process of retaliation, certain maxims are necessary as instruments or as checks to abuse; as that involuntary acts are not punishable; that no one shall be condemned unheard; that punishment should be proportioned to the offence.  Impartiality, the first of judicial virtues, is necessary to the fulfilment of the other conditions of justice:  while from the highest form of doing to each according to their deserts, it is the abstract standard of social and distributive justice; and is in this sense a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, the principle of the greatest Happiness.  All social inequalities that have ceased to be considered as expedient, assume the character, not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice.

Besides the ‘Utilitarianism,’ Mr. Mill’s chief Ethical dissertations are his review of Whewell’s Moral Treatises (Dissertations and Discussions, Vol.  II.), and parts of his Essay on Liberty.  By collecting his views generally under the usual heads, we shall find a place for some points additional to what are given in the foregoing abstract.

I.—­Enough has been stated as to his Ethical Standard, the Principle of Utility.

II.—­We have seen his Psychological explanation of the Moral Faculty, as a growth from certain elementary feelings of the mind.

He has also discussed extensively the Freedom of the Will, maintaining the strict causation of human actions, and refuting the supposed fatalistic tendency of the doctrine.

He believes, as we have seen, in Disinterested impulses, but traces them to a purely self-regarding origin.

III.—­He does not give any formal dissertation on Human Happiness, but indicates many of its important conditions, as in the remarks cited above, p. 702.  In the chapter of the work on ‘Liberty,’ entitled Individuality, he illustrates the great importance of special tastes, and urges the full right of each person to the indulgence of these in every case where they do not directly injure others.  He reclaims against the social tyranny prevailing on such points as dress, personal habits, and eccentricities.

IV.—­As regards the Moral Code, he would repeal the legal and moral rule that makes marriage irrevocable.  He would also abolish all restraints on freedom of thought, and on Individuality of conduct, qualified as above stated.