Chapter V. is ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY.

The strongest obstacle to the doctrine of Utility has been drawn from the Idea of Justice.  The rapid perception and the powerful sentiment connected with the Just, seem to show it as generically distinct from every variety of the Expedient.

To see whether the sense of justice can be explained on grounds of Utility, the author begins by surveying in the concrete the things usually denominated just.  In the first place, it is commonly considered unjust to deprive any one of their personal liberty, or property, or anything secured to them by law:  in other words, it is unjust to violate any one’s legal rights.  Secondly, The legal rights of a man may be such as ought not to have belonged to him; that is, the law conferring those rights may be a bad law.  When a law is bad, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it; some think that no law should be disobeyed by the individual citizen; others hold that it is just to resist unjust laws.  It is thus admitted by all that there is such a thing as moral right, the refusal of which is injustice.  Thirdly, it is considered just that each person should receive what he deserves (whether good or evil).  And a person is understood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and in particular to deserve good in return for good, and evil in return for evil.  Fourthly, it is unjust to break faith, to violate an engagement, or disappoint expectations knowingly and voluntarily raised.  Like other obligations, this is not absolute, but may be overruled by some still stronger demand of justice on the other side.  Fifthly, it is inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favour or preference in matters where favour does not apply.  We are expected in certain cases to prefer our friends to strangers; but a tribunal is bound to the strictest impartiality; rewards and punishments should be administered impartially; so likewise the patronage of important public offices.  Nearly allied to impartiality is the idea of equality.  The justice of giving equal protection to the rights of all is maintained even when the rights themselves are very unequal, as in slavery and in the system of ranks or castes.  There are the greatest differences as to what is equality in the distribution of the produce of labour; some thinking that all should receive alike; others that the neediest should receive most; others that the distribution should be according to labour or services.

To get a clue to the common idea running through all these meanings, the author refers to the etymology of the word, which, in most languages, points to something ordained by law.  Even although there be many things considered just, that we do not usually enforce by law, yet in these cases it would give us pleasure if law could be brought to bear upon offenders.  When we think a person bound in justice to do a thing, we should like to see him punished for not doing it; we lament the obstacles that may be in the way, and strive to make amends by a strong expression of our own opinion.  The idea of legal constraint is thus the generating idea of justice throughout all its transformations.