The basis of natural sentiment capable of supporting the utilitarian morality is to be found in the social feelings of mankind.  The social state is so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that he can hardly conceive himself otherwise than as a member of society; and as civilization advances, this association becomes more firmly riveted.  All strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in consulting the welfare of others.  Each comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being that of course pays regard to others.  There is the strongest motive in each person to manifest this sentiment, and, even if he should not feel it strongly himself, to cherish it in everybody else.  The smallest germs of the feeling are thus laid hold of, and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and by the powerful agency of the external sanctions there is woven around it a complete web of corroborative association.  In an improving state of society, the influences are on the increase that generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of anything for self, if they also were not included.  Suppose, now, that this feeling of unity were taught as a religion, and that the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, were directed to make every person grow up surrounded with the profession and the practice of it; can there be any doubt as to the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality?

Even in our present low state of advancement, the deeply-rooted conception that each individual has of himself as a social being tends to make him wish to be in harmony with his fellow-creatures.  The feeling may be, in most persons, inferior in strength to the selfish feelings, and may be altogether wanting; but to such as possess it, it has all the characters of a natural feeling, and one that they would not desire to be without.

Chapter IV. is OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY is susceptible.  Questions about ends are questions as to what things are desirable.  According to the theory of Utility, happiness is desirable as an end; all other things are desirable as means.  What is the proof of this doctrine?

As the proof, that the sun is visible, is that people actually see it, so the proof that happiness is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.  No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, beyond the fact that each one desires their own happiness.

But granting that people desire happiness as one of their ends of conduct, do they never desire anything else?  To all appearance they do; they desire virtue, and the absence of vice, no less surely than pleasure and the absence of pain.  Hence the opponents of utility consider themselves entitled to infer that happiness is not the standard of moral approbation and disapprobation.