It is unquestionably possible to do without happiness.  This is the lot of the greater part of mankind, and is often voluntarily chosen by the hero or the martyr.  But self-sacrifice is not its own end; it must be made to earn for others immunity from sacrifice.  It must be a very imperfect state of the world’s arrangements that requires any one to serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of their own; yet undoubtedly while the world is in that imperfect state, the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue that can be found in man.  Nay, farther, the conscious ability to do without happiness, in such a condition of the world, is the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable.  Meanwhile, self-devotion belongs as much to the Utilitarian as to the Stoic or the Transcendentalist; with the reservation that a sacrifice not tending to increase the sum of happiness is to be held as wasted.  The golden rule, do as you would be done by, is the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.  The means of approaching this ideal are, first, that laws and society should endeavour to place the interest of the individual in harmony with the interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education and opinion should establish in the mind of each individual an indissoluble association between his own good and the good of the whole.

The system of Utility is objected to, on another side, as being too high for humanity; men cannot be perpetually acting with a view to the general interests of society.  But this is to mistake the meaning of a standard, and to confound the rule of action with the motive.  Ethics tells us what are our duties, or by what test we are to know them; but no system of ethics requires that the motive of every action should be a feeling of duty; our actions are rightly done provided only duty does not condemn them.  The great majority of actions have nothing to do with the good of the world—­they end with the individual; it happens to few persons, and that rarely, to be public benefactors.  Private utility is in the mass of cases all that we have to attend to.  As regards abstinences, indeed, it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be aware that the action is one that, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and to not feel a sense of obligation on that ground; but such an amount of regard for the general interest is required under every system of morals.

It is farther alleged against Utility, that it renders men cold and unsympathizing, chills the moral feelings towards individuals, and regards only the dry consequences of actions, without reference to the moral qualities of the agent.  The author replies that Utility, like any other system, admits that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character.  Still, he contends, in the long run, the best proof of a good character is good actions.  If the objection means that utilitarians do not lay sufficient stress on the beauties of character, he replies that this is the accident of persons cultivating their moral feelings more than their sympathies and artistic perceptions, and may occur under every view of the foundation of morals.