It very naturally occurred to many readers of Whewell’s scheme, that in so far as he endeavours to give any reason for the foundations of morality, he runs in a vicious circle.  He proposes to establish his supreme universal rule, by showing it to be only a summing up of certain rules swaying the several portions or departments of our nature—­Veracity, Justice, &c., while, in considering the obligation of these rules, he assumes that man is a moral being, which is another way of saying that he is to be under a supreme moral rule.  In his latest edition, the author has replied to this charge, but so briefly as to cast no new light on his position.  He only repeats that the Supreme rule of Human Action is given by the constitution and conditions of human nature.  His ethical principle may be not unfairly expressed by saying, that he recognizes a certain intrinsic fitness in exercising the organ of speech according to its social uses, that is, in promoting a right understanding among men; and so with Justice, as the fitness of property, and Humanity, as the fitness of the Affections.  This fitness is intuitively felt.  Human happiness is admitted to be a consequence of these rules; but happiness is not a sufficient end in itself; morality is also an end in itself.  Human happiness is not to be conceived or admitted, except as containing a moral element; in addition to the direct gratifications of human life, we must include the delight of virtue. [How men can be compelled to postpone their pleasurable sense of the good things of life, till they have contracted a delight in virtue for its own sake, the author does not say.  It has been the great object of moralists in all ages, to impart by education such a state of mind as to spoil the common gratifications, if they are viciously procured; the comparatively little success of the endeavour, shows that nature has done little to favour it.]

The foregoing is an abstract of the Introduction to the 4th Edition of the Elements of Morality.  We shall present the author’s views respecting the other questions of Morality in the form of the usual summary.

I.—­As regards the Standard, enough has been already indicated.

II.—­The Psychology of the Moral Faculty is given by Whewell as part of a classification of our Active Powers, or, as he calls them, Springs of Action.  These are:  I.—­The Appetites or Bodily Desires, as Hunger and Thirst, and the desires of whatever things have been found to gratify the senses.  II.—­The Affections, which are directed to persons; they fall under the two heads Love and Anger.  III.—­The Mental Desires, having for their objects certain abstractions.  They are the desire of Safety, including Security and Liberty; the desire of Having, or Property; the desire of Society in all its forms—­Family Society and Civil Society, under which is included the need of Mutual Understanding; the desire of Superiority; and the Desire of Knowledge.  IV.—­The