The author adapts Paley’s supposition of the savage, in order to express strongly what the moral sense implies.  But we will confine ourselves to his reasonings.  Is there, he asks, any evidence of our being gifted with such feelings?  The very putting of such a question would seem a sufficient proof that we are not so endowed.  There ought to be no more doubt about them, than about hunger or thirst.

It is alleged in their favour that our judgments of rectitude and depravity are immediate and voluntary.  The reply is that sentiments begotten by association are no less prompt and involuntary than our instincts.  Our response to a money gain, or a money loss, is as prompt as our compliance with the primitive appetites of the system.  We begin by loving knowledge as a means to ends; but, in time, the end is inseparably associated with the instrument.  So a moral sentiment dictated by utility, if often exercised, would be rapid and direct in its operation.

It is farther alleged, as a proof of the innate character of the moral judgments, that the moral sentiments of all men are precisely alike.  The argument may be put thus:—­No opinion or sentiment resulting from observation and induction is held or felt by all mankind:  Observation and induction, as applied to the same subject, lead different men to different conclusions.  Now, the judgments passed internally on the rectitude or pravity of actions, or the moral sentiments, are precisely alike with all men.  Therefore, our moral sentiments are not the result of our inductions of the tendencies of actions; nor were they derived from others, and impressed by authority and example.  Consequently, the moral sentiments are instinctive, or ultimate and inscrutable facts.

To refute such an argument is superfluous; it is based on a groundless assertion.  The moral sentiments of men have differed to infinity.  With regard to a few classes of actions, the moral judgments of most, though not of all, men have been alike.  With regard to others, they have differed, through every shade or degree, from slight diversity to direct opposition.

But this is exactly what we should expect on the principle of utility.  With regard to some actions, the dictates of utility are the same at all times and places, and are so obvious as hardly to admit of mistake or doubt.  On the other hand, men’s positions in different ages and nations are in many respects widely different; so that what was useful there and then is useless or pernicious here and now.  Moreover, since human tastes are various, and human reason is fallible, men’s moral sentiments often widely differ in the same positions.

He next alludes to some prevailing misconceptions in regard to utility.  One is the confusion of the test with the motive.  The general good is the test, or rather the index to the ultimate measure or test, the Divine commands; but it is not in all, or even in most cases, the motive or inducement.