In the work entitled, ‘A Fragment on Mackintosh,’ there are afforded farther illustrations of the author’s derivation of the Moral Sentiment, together with an exposition and defence of Utility as the standard, in which his views are substantially at one with Bentham.  Two or three references will be sufficient.

In the statement of the questions in dispute in Morals, he objects to the words ‘test’ and ‘criterion,’ as expressing the standard.  He considers it a mistake to designate as a ‘test’ what is the thing itself; the test of Morality is Morality.  Properly, the thing testing is one thing; the thing tested another thing.  The same objection would apply to the use of the word Standard; so that the only form of the first question of Ethics would be, What is morality?  What does it consist in? [The remark is just, but somewhat hypercritical.  The illustration from Chemical testing is not true in fact; the test of gold is some essential attribute of gold, as its weight.  And when we wish to determine as to a certain act, whether it is a moral act, we compare it with what we deem the essential quality of moral acts—­Utility, our Moral Instinct, &c.—­and the operation is not improperly called testing the act.  Since, therefore, whatever we agree upon as the essence of morality, must be practically used by us as a test, criterion, or standard, there cannot be much harm in calling this essential quality the standard, although the designation is to a certain extent figurative.]

The author has some additional remarks on the derivation of our Disinterested feelings:  he reiterates the position expressed in the ‘Analysis,’ that although we have feelings directly tending to the good of others, they are nevertheless the growth of feelings that are rooted in self.  That feelings should be detached from their original root is a well known phenomenon of the mind.

His illustrations of Utility are a valuable contribution to the defence of that doctrine.  He replies to most of the common objections.  Mackintosh had urged that the reference to Utility would be made a dangerous pretext for allowing exceptions to common rules.  Mill expounds at length (p. 246) the formation of moral rules, and retorts that there are rules expressly formed to make exceptions to other rules, as justice before generosity, charity begins at home, &c.

He animadverts with great severity on Mackintosh’s doctrines, as to the delight of virtue for its own sake, and the special contact of moral feelings with the will.  Allowance being made for the great difference in the way that the two writers express themselves, they are at one in maintaining Utility to be the ultimate standard, and in regarding Conscience as a derived faculty of the mind.

The author’s handling of Ethics does not extend beyond the first and second topics—­the STANDARD and the FACULTY.  His Standard is Utility.  The Faculty is based on our Pleasures and Pains, with which there are multiplied associations.  Disinterested Sentiment is a real fact, but has its origin in our own proper pleasures and pains.