We have next a class of associations with other men’s performance of the several virtues.  The Prudence and the Fortitude of others are directly beneficial to them, and indirectly beneficial to us; and with both these consequences we have necessarily agreeable associations.  The Justice and the Beneficence of other men are so directly beneficial to the objects of them, that it is impossible for us not to have pleasurable associations with acts of Justice and Beneficence, first as concerns ourselves in particular, and next as concerns the acts generally.  Hence, therefore, the rise of Affections and Motives in favour of these two virtues.  As there is nothing so deeply interesting to me as that the acts of men, regarding myself immediately, should be acts of Justice and Beneficence, and the acts regarding themselves immediately, acts of Prudence and Fortitude; it follows that I have an interest in all such acts of my own as operate to cause those acts in others.  By similar acts of our own, by the manifestation of dispositions to perform those acts, we obtain their reciprocal performance by others.  There is thus a highly complex, concurring stimulus to acts of virtue,—­a large aggregate of influences of association, the power at bottom being still our own pleasurable and painful sensations.  We must add the ascription of Praise, an influence remarkable for its wide propagation and great efficacy over men’s minds, and no less remarkable as a proof of the range of the associating principle, especially in its character of Fame, which, in the case of future fame, is a purely ideal or associated delight.  Equally, if not more, striking are the illustrations from Dispraise.  The associations of Disgrace, even when not sufficient to restrain the performance of acts abhorred by mankind, are able to produce the horrors of Remorse, the most intense of human sufferings.  The love of praise leads by one step to the love of Praiseworthiness; the dread of blame, to the dread of Blameworthiness.

Of these various Motives, the most constant in operation, and the most in use in moral training, are Praise and Blame.  It is the sensibility to Praise and Blame—­the joyful feelings associated with the one, and the dread associated with the other—­that gives effect to POPULAR OPINION, or the POPULAR SANCTION, and, with reference to men generally, the MORAL SANCTION.

The other motives to virtue, namely, the association of our own acts of Justice and Beneficence, as cause, with other men’s as effects, are subject to strong counteraction, for we can rarely perform such acts without sacrifice to ourselves.  Still, there is in all men a certain surplus of motive from this cause, just as there is a surplus from the association of acts of ours, hostile to other men, with a return of hostility on their part.

The best names for the aggregate Affection, Motive, and Disposition in this important region of conduct, are Moral Approbation and Disapprobation.  The terms Moral Sense, Sense of Right and Wrong, Love of Virtue and Hatred of Vice, are not equally appropriate.  Virtue and Morality are other synonyms.