Alluding (XX.) to the important difference between past and future time in our ideas of pleasure and pain, he defines Hope and Fear as the contemplation of a pleasurable or of a painful sensation, as future, but not certain.

When the immediate causes of pleasurable and painful sensations are viewed as past or future, we have a new series of states.  In the past, they are called Love and Hatred, or Aversion; in the future, the idea of a pleasure, as certain in its arrival, is Joy—­as probable, Hope; the idea of future pain (certain) is not marked otherwise than by the names Hatred, Aversion, Horror; the idea of the pain as probable is some form of dread.

The remote causes of our pleasures and pains are more interesting than the immediate causes.  The reason is their wide command.  Thus, Wealth, Power, and Dignity are causes cf a great range of pleasures:  Poverty, Impotence, and Contemptibility, of a wide range of pains.  For one thing, the first are the means of procuring the services of our fellow-creatures; this fact is of the highest consequence in morals, as showing how deeply our happiness is entwined with the actions of other beings.  The author illustrates at length the influence of these remote and comprehensive agencies; and as it is an influence entirely the result of association, it attests the magnitude of that power of the mind.

But our fellow-creatures are the subjects of affections, not merely as the instrumentality set in motion by Wealth, Power, and Dignity, but in their proper personality.  This leads the author to the consideration of the pleasurable affections of Friendship, Kindness, Family, Country, Party, Mankind.  He resolves them all into associations with our primitive pleasures.  Thus, to take the example of Kindness, which will show how he deals with the disinterested affection;—­The idea of a man enjoying a train of pleasures, or happiness, is felt by everybody to be a pleasurable idea; this can arise from nothing but the association of our own pleasures with the idea of his pleasures.  The pleasurable association composed of the ideas of a man and of his pleasures, and the painful association composed of the idea of a man and of his pains, are both Affections included under one name Kindness; although in the second case it has the more specific name Compassion.

Under the other heads, the author’s elucidation is fuller, but his principle is the same.

He next goes on (XXII.) to MOTIVES.  When the idea of a Pleasure is associated with an action of our own as the cause, that peculiar state of mind is generated, called a motive.  The idea of the pleasure, without the idea of an action for gaining it, does not amount to a motive.  Every pleasure may become a motive, but every motive does not end in action, because there may be counter-motives; and the strength attained by motives depends greatly on education.  The facility of being acted on by motives of a particular kind is a DISPOSITION.  We have, in connexion with all our leading pleasures and pains, names indicating their motive efficacy.  Gluttony is both motive and disposition; so Lust and Drunkenness; with the added sense of reprobation in all the three.  Friendship is a name for Affection, Motive, and Disposition.