He carries the process of associative growth a step farther, and maintains that we re-convert disinterestedness into a lofty delight—­the delight in goodness for its own sake; to attain this characteristic is the highest mark of a virtuous character.

III.—–­His Summum Bonum, or Theory of Happiness, is contained in his much iterated doctrine of the deliciousness of virtuous conduct, by which he proposes to effect the reconciliation of our own good with the good of others—­prudence with virtue.  Virtue is ’an inward fountain of pure delight;’ the pleasure of benevolence, ’if it could become lasting and intense, would convert the heart into a heaven;’ they alone are happy, or truly virtuous, that do not need the motive of a regard to outward consequences.

His chief Ethical precursor in this vein is Shaftesbury; but he is easily able to produce from Theologians abundant iterations of it.

IV.—­He has no special views as to the Moral Code.  With reference to the inducements to virtue, he thinks he has a powerful lever in the delights that the virtuous disposition confers on its owner.

V.—­His theory of the connexion of Ethics and Politics is stated in his account of Bentham, whom he charges with making morality too judicial.

VI.—­The relations of Morality to Religion are a matter of frequent and special consideration in Mackintosh.

JAMES MILL. [1783-1836.]

The work of James Mill, entitled the ‘Analysis of the Human Mind,’ is distinguished, in the first glace, by the studied precision of its definitions of all leading terms, giving it a permanent value as a logical discipline; and in the second place, by the successful carrying out of the principle of Association in explaining the powers of the mind.  The author endeavours to show that the moral feelings are a complex product or growth, of which the ultimate constituents are our pleasurable and painful sensations.  We shall present a brief abstract of the course of his exposition, as given in Chapters XVII.—­XXIII. of the Analysis.

The pleasurable and painful sensations being assumed, it is important to take notice of their Causes, both immediate and remote, by whose means they can be secured or avoided.  We contract a habit of passing rapidly from every sensation to its procuring cause; and, as in the typical case of money, these causes are apt to rank higher in importance, to take a greater hold on the mind, than the sensations themselves.  The mind is not much interested in attending to the sensation; that can provide for itself.  The mind is deeply interested in attending to the cause.

The author next (XIX.) considers the Ideas of the pleasurable sensations, and of the causes of them.  The Idea of a pain is not the same as the pain; it is a complex state, containing, no doubt, an element of pain; and the name for it is Aversion.  So the name for an idea of pleasure is Desire.  Now, these states extend to the causes of pains and pleasures, though in other respects indifferent; we have an aversion for a certain drug, but there is in this a transition highly illustrative of the force of the associating principle; our real aversion being to a bitter sensation, and not to the visible appearance of the drug.