He complains that, in the enquiry as to the foundation of morals, the two distinct questions—­as to the Standard and the Faculty—­have seldom been fully discriminated.  Thus, Paley opposes Utility to a Moral Sense, not perceiving that the two terms relate to different subjects; and Bentham repeats the mistake.  It is possible to represent Utility as the criterion of Right, and a Moral Sense as the faculty.  In another place, he remarks that the schoolmen failed to draw the distinction.

In Section V., entitled ’Controversies concerning the Moral Faculty and the Social Affections,’ and including the Ethical theories coming between Hobbes and Butler, namely, Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, &c., he gives his objections to the scheme that founds moral distinctions solely on the Reason.  Reason, as such, can never be a motive to action; an argument to dissuade a man from drunkenness must appeal to the pains of ill-health, poverty, and infamy, that is, to Feelings.  The influence of Reason is indirect; it is merely a channel whereby the objects of desire are brought into view, so as to operate on the Will.

The abused extension of the term Reason to the moral faculties, he ascribes to the obvious importance of Reason in choosing the means of action, as well as in balancing the ends, during which operation the feelings are suspended, delayed, and poised in a way favourable to our lasting interests.  Hence the antithesis of Reason and Passion.

In remarking upon Leibnitz’s view of Disinterested Sentiment, and the coincidence of Virtue with Happiness, he sketches his own opinion, which is that although every virtuous act may not lead to the greater happiness of the agent, yet the disposition to virtuous acts, in its intrinsic pleasures, far outweighs all the pains of self-sacrifice that it can ever occasion.  ’The whole sagacity and ingenuity of the world may be fairly challenged to point out a case in which virtuous dispositions, habits, and feelings are not conducive in the highest degree to the happiness of the individual; or to maintain that he is not the happiest, whose moral sentiments and affections are such as to prevent the possibility of any unlawful advantage being presented to his mind.’

Section VI. is entitled ‘Foundations of a more Just Theory of Ethics,’ and embraces a review of all the Ethical writers, from Butler downwards.  The most palpable defect in Butler’s scheme, is that it affords no answer to the question, ’What is the distinguishing quality of right actions?’ in other words, What is the Standard?  There is a vicious circle in answering that they are commanded by Conscience, for Conscience itself can be no otherwise defined than as the faculty that approves and commands right actions.  Still, he gives warm commendation to Butler generally; in connexion with him he takes occasion to give some farther hints as to his own opinions.  Two positions are here advanced: