III.—­As regards Happiness, or the Summum Bonum, he presents his scientific classification of Pleasures and Pains, without, however, indicating any plan of life, for attaining the one and avoiding the other in the best manner.  He makes no distinction among pleasures and pains excepting what strictly concerns their value as such—­intensity, duration, certainty, and nearness.  He makes happiness to mean only the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain.  The renunciation of pleasure for any other motive than to procure a greater pleasure, or avoid a greater pain, he, disapprovingly, terms asceticism.

IV.—­It being the essence of his system to consider Ethics as a Code of Laws directed by Utility, and he being himself a law reformer on the greatest scale, we might expect from him suggestions for the improvement of Ethics, as well as for Legislation and Jurisprudence.  His inclusion of the interests of the lower animals has been mentioned.  He also contends for the partly legislative and partly ethical innovation of Freedom of Divorce.

The inducements to morality are the motives assigned as working in its favour.

V.—­The connexions of Ethics with Politics, the points of agreement and the points of difference of the two departments, are signified with unprecedented care and precision (Chap.  XVII.)

VI.—­As regards the connexions with Theology, he gives no uncertain sound.  It is on this point that he stands in marked contrast to Paley, who also professes Utility as his ethical foundation.

He recognizes religion as furnishing one of the Sanctions of morality, although often perverted into the enemy of utility.  He considers that the state may regard as offences any acts that tend to diminish or misapply the influence of religion as a motive to civil obedience.

While Paley makes a conjoined reference to Scripture and to Utility in ascertaining moral rules, Bentham insists on Utility alone as the final appeal.  He does not doubt that if we had a clear unambiguous statement of the divine will, we should have a revelation of what is for human happiness; but he distrusts all interpretations of scripture, unless they coincide with a perfectly independent scientific investigation of the consequences of actions.

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH. [1765-1832.]

In the ’Dissertation on the progress of Ethical Philosophy chiefly during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,’ Mackintosh advocates a distinct Ethical theory.  His views and arguments occur partly in the course of his criticism of the other moralists, and partly in his concluding General Remarks (Section VII.).

In Section I., entitled PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, he remarks on the universality of the distinction between Right and Wrong.  On no subject do men, in all ages, coincide on so many points as on the general rules of conduct, and the estimable qualities of character.  Even the grossest deviations may be explained by ignorance of facts, by errors with respect to the consequences of actions, or by inconsistency with admitted principles.  In tribes where new-born infants are exposed, the abandonment of parents is condemned; the betrayal and murder of strangers is condemned by the very rules of faith and humanity, acknowledged in the case of countrymen.