The first part of Chapter XVII. is entitled the ’Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation;’ and a short account of it will complete the view of the author’s Ethical Theory.

Ethics at large, is defined the art of directing men’s actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view, Now, these actions may be a man’s own actions, in which case they are styled the art of self-government, or private ethics.  Or they may be the actions of other agents, namely, (1) Other human beings, and (2) Other Animals, whose interests Bentham considers to have been disgracefully overlooked by jurists as well as by mankind generally.

In so far as a man’s happiness depends on his own conduct, he may be said to owe a duty to himself; the quality manifested in discharge of this branch of duty (if duty it is to be called) is PRUDENCE.  In so far as he affects by his conduct the interests of those about him, he is under a duty to others.  The happiness of others may be consulted in two ways.  First, negatively, by forbearing to diminish it; this is called PROBITY.  Secondly, in a positive way, by studying to increase it; which is expressed by BENEFICENCE.

But now the question occurs, how is it that under Private Ethics (or apart from legislation and religion) a man can be tinder a motive to consult other people’s happiness?  By what obligations can he be bound to probity and beneficence?  A man can have no adequate motives for consulting any interests but his own.  Still there are motives for making us consult the happiness of others, namely, the purely social motive of Sympathy or Benevolence, and the semi-social motives of Love of Amity and Love of Reputation. [He does not say here whether Sympathy is a motive grounded on the pleasure it brings, or a motive irrespective of the pleasure; although from other places we may infer that he inclines to the first view.]

Private Ethics and Legislation can have but the same end, happiness.  Their means, the actions prompted, must be nearly the same.  Still they are different.  There is no case where a man ought not to be guided by his own, or his fellow-creatures’, happiness; but there are many cases where the legislature should not compel a man to perform such actions.  The reason is that the Legislature works solely by Punishment (reward is seldom applied, and is not properly an act of legislation).  Now, there are cases where the punishment of the political sanction ought not to be used; and if, in any of these cases, there is a propriety of using the punishments of private ethics (the moral or social sanction), this circumstance would indicate the line of division.

First, then, as to the cases where punishment would be groundless.  In such cases, neither legislation nor private ethics should interfere.

Secondly.  As to cases where it would be inefficacious, where punishment has no deterring motive power,—­as in Infancy, Insanity, overwhelming danger, &c.,—­the public and the private sanctions are also alike excluded.