After these three motives, Bentham places the Dictates of Religion, which, however, are so various in their suggestions, that he can hardly speak of them in common.  Were the Being, who is the object of religion, universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and powerful, and were the notions of his benevolence as correct as the notions of his wisdom and power, the dictates of religion would correspond, in all cases, with Utility.  But while men call him benevolent in words, they seldom mean that he is so in reality.  They do not mean that he is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent; they do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense that benevolence has a meaning.  The dictates of religion are in all countries intermixed, more or less, with dictates unconformable to utility, deduced from texts, well or ill interpreted, of the writings held for sacred by each sect.  These dictates, however, gradually approach nearer to utility, because the dictates of the moral sanction do so.

Such are the four Social or Tutelary Motives, the antagonists of the Dissocial and Self-regarding motives, which include the remainder of the catalogue.

Chapter XI. is on DISPOSITIONS.  A man is said to be of a mischievous disposition, when he is presumed to be apt to engage rather in actions of an apparently pernicious tendency, than in such as are apparently beneficial.  The author lays down certain Rules for indicating Disposition.  Thus, ’The strength of the temptation being given, the mischievousness of the disposition manifested by the enterprise, is as the apparent mischievousness of the act,’ and others to a like effect.

Chapter XII.—­OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MISCHIEVOUS ACT, is meant as the concluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects.  He defines the shapes that bad consequences may assume.  The mischief may be primary, as when sustained by a definite number of individuals; or secondary, by extending over a multitude of unassignable individuals.  The evil in this last case may be either actual pain, or danger, which is the chance of pain.  Thus, a successful robbery affects, primarily, a number of assignable persons, and secondarily, all persons in a like situation of risk.

He then proceeds to the theory of PUNISHMENT (XIII., XIV., XV.), to the classification of OFFENCES (XVI.), and to the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence (XVII.).  The two first subjects—­Punishments and Offences—­are interesting chiefly in regard to Legislation.  They have also a bearing on Morals; inasmuch as society, in its private administration of punishments, ought, no less than the Legislator, to be guided by sound scientific principles.

As respects Punishment, he marks off (1) cases where it is groundless; (2) where it is inefficacious, as in Infancy, Insanity, Intoxication, &c.; (3) cases where it is unprofitable; and (4) cases where it is needless.  It is under this last herd that he excludes from punishment the dissemination of what may be deemed pernicious principles.  Punishment is needless here, because the end can be served by reply and exposure.