Sympathetic Sensibility. 15.  Sympathetic biases. 16.  Antipathetic sensibility. 17.  Antipathetic biases. 18.  Insanity. 19.  Habitual occupations. 20.  Pecuniary circumstances. 21.  Connexions in the way of sympathy. 22.  Connexions in the way of antipathy. 23.  Radical frame of body. 24.  Radical frame of mind. 25.  Sex. 26.  Age. 27.  Rank. 28.  Education. 29.  Climate. 30.  Lineage. 31.  Government. 32.  Religious profession.

Chapter VII. proceeds to consider HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENERAL.  Right and wrong, good and evil, merit and demerit belong to actions.  These have to be divided and classified with a view to the ends of the moralist and the legislator.  Throughout this, and two other long chapters, he discusses, as necessary in apportioning punishment, the act itself, the circumstances, the intention, and the consciousness—­or the knowledge of the tendencies of the act.  He introduces many subdivisions under each head, and makes a number of remarks of importance as regards penal legislation.

In Chapter X., he regards pleasures and pains in the aspect of MOTIVES.  Since every pleasure and every pain, as a part of their nature, induce actions, they are often designated with reference to that circumstance.  Hunger, thirst, lust, avarice, curiosity, ambition, &c., are names of this class.  There is not a complete set of such designations; hence the use of the circumlocutions, appetite for, love of, desire of—­sweet odours, sounds, sights, ease, reputation, &c.

Of great importance is the Order of pre-eminence among motives.  Of all the varieties of motives, Good-will, or Benevolence, taken in a general view, is that whose dictates are surest to coincide with Utility.  In this, however, it is taken for granted that the benevolence is not so confined in its sphere, as to be contradicted by a more extensive, or enlarged, benevolence.

After good-will, the motive that has the best chance of coinciding with Utility is Love of Reputation.  The coincidence would be perfect, if men’s likings and dislikings were governed exclusively by the principle of Utility, and not, as they often are, by the hostile principles of Asceticism, and of Sympathy and Antipathy.  Love of reputation is inferior as a motive to Good-will, in not governing the secret actions.  These last are affected, only as they have a chance of becoming public, or as men contract a habit of looking to public approbation in all they do.

The desire of Amity, or of close personal affections, is placed next in order, as a motive.  According as we extend the number of persons whose amity we desire, this prompting approximates to the love of reputation.