III.—­He has an explicit scheme of Happiness.

IV.—­The Substance of his Moral Code is distinguished from, the current opinions chiefly by his well-known views on Subscription to Articles.  He cannot conceive how, looking to the incurable diversity of human opinion on all matters short of demonstration, the legislature could expect the perpetual consent of a body of ten thousand men, not to one controverted proposition, but to many hundreds.

His inducements to the performance of duty are, as we should expect, a mixed reference to Public Utility and to Scripture.

In the Indeterminate Duties, where men are urged by moral considerations, to the exclusion of legal compulsion, he sometimes appeals directly to our generous sympathies, as well as to self-interest, but usually ends with the Scripture authority.

V.—­The relation of Ethics to Politics is not a prominent feature in Paley.  He makes moral rules repose finally, not upon human, but upon Divine Law.  Hence (VI.) the connexion of his system with Theology is fundamental.

JEREMY BENTHAM. [1748-1832.]

The Ethical System of Jeremy Bentham is given in his work, entitled ’An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,’ first published in 1789.  In a posthumous work, entitled Deontology, his principles were farther illustrated, chiefly with reference to the minor morals and amiable virtues.

It is the first-named work that we shall here chiefly notice.  In it, the author has principally in view Legislation; but the same common basis, Utility, serves, in his judgment, for Ethics, or Morals.

The first chapter, entitled ‘THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY,’ begins thus:—­’Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.  On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong; on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.  They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.  In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.  The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hand of reason and of law.  Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.’