Under the ‘general Rights of mankind,’ he has a discussion as to our right to the flesh of animals, and contends that it would be difficult to defend this right by any arguments drawn from the light of nature, and that it reposes on the text of Genesis ix. 1, 2, 3.

As regards the chief bulk of Paley’s-work, it is necessary only to indicate his scheme of the Duties, and his manner of treating them.

Book III. considers RELATIVE DUTIES.  There are three classes of these.  First, Relative Duties that are Determinate, meaning all those that are strictly defined and enforced; those growing out of Promises, Contracts, Oaths, and Subscriptions to Articles of Religion.  Secondly, Relative Duties that are Indeterminate, as Charity, in its various aspects of treatment of dependents, assistance to the needy, &c.; the checks on Anger and Revenge; Gratitude, &c.  Thirdly, the Relative Duties growing out of the Sexes.

Book IV. is DUTIES TO OURSELVES, and treats of Self-defence, Drunkenness, and Suicide.

Book V. comprises DUTIES TOWARDS GOD.

Book VI. is occupied with Politics and Political Economy.  It discusses the Origin of Civil Government, the Duty of Submission to Government, Liberty, the Forms of Government, the British Constitution, the Administration of Justice, &c.

The Ethical Theory of Paley may be briefly resumed thus:—­

I.—­The Ethical Standard with him is the conjoined reference to the Will of the Deity, and to Utility, or Human Happiness.  He is unable to construct a scheme applicable to mankind generally, until they are first converted to a belief in Revelation.

II.—­The Psychology implied in his system involves his most characteristic features.

1.  He is unmistakeable in repudiating Innate Moral Distinctions, and on this point, and on this only, is he thoroughly at one with the Utilitarians of the present day.

2.  On the Theory of Will he has no remarks.  He has an utter distaste for anything metaphysical.

3.  He does not discuss Disinterested Sentiment; by implication, he denies it.  ‘Without the expectation of a future existence,’ he says, ‘all reasoning upon moral questions is vain.’  He cannot, of course, leave out all reference to generosity.  Under ‘Pecuniary Bounty’ he makes this remark—­’They who rank pity amongst the original impulses of our nature, rightly contend, that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates the Divine intention and our duty.  Whether it be an instinct or a habit (?), it is, in fact, a property of our nature, which God appointed, &c.’  This is his first argument for charity; the second is derived from the original title of mankind, granted by the Deity, to hold the earth in common; and the third is the strong injunctions of Scripture on this head.  He cannot, it seems, trust human nature with a single charitable act apart from the intervention of the Deity.