He then resumes the general question, under a concrete case, ’Why am I obliged to keep my word?’ The answer accords with the above explanation;—­Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely, the rewards and punishments of a future life), resulting from the command of God.  Private happiness is the motive, the will of God the rule. [Although not brought out in the present connexion, it is implied that the will of God intends the happiness of mankind, and is to be interpreted accordingly.]

Previously, when reasoning on the means of human happiness, he declared it to be an established conclusion, that virtue leads to happiness, even in this life; now he bases his own theory on the uncertainty of that conclusion.  His words are, ’They who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future state, must look out for some other idea of moral obligation, unless they can show that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.’  He does not make the obvious remark that human authority, as far as it goes, is also a source of obligation; it works by the very same class of means as the divine authority.

He next proceeds to enquire into the means of determining the WILL OF GOD.  There are two sources—­the express declarations of Scripture, when they are to be had; and the design impressed on the world, in other words, the light of nature.  This last source requires him, on his system, to establish the Divine Benevolence; and he arrives at the conclusion that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, and accordingly, that the method of coming at his will concerning any action is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or to diminish the general happiness.

He then discusses UTILITY, with a view of answering the objection that actions may be useful, and yet such as no man will allow to be right.  This leads him to distinguish between the particular and the general consequences of actions, and to enforce the necessity of GENERAL RULES.  An assassin, by knocking a rich villain on the head, may do immediate and particular good; but the liberty granted to individuals to kill whoever they should deem injurious to society, would render human life unsafe, and induce universal terror.  ’Whatever is expedient is right,’ but then it must be expedient on the whole, in the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as immediate and direct.  When the honestum is opposed to the utile, the honestum means the general and remote consequences, the utile the particular and the near.

The concluding sections of Book II. are occupied with the consideration of RIGHT and RIGHTS.  A Right is of course correlative with an Obligation.  Rights are Natural or Adventitious; Alienable or Inalienable; Perfect or Imperfect.  The only one of these distinctions having any Ethical application is Perfect and Imperfect.  The Perfect Rights are, the Imperfect are not, enforced by Law.