So much in reply to the alleged uniformity.  Next come the positive objections to a Moral Instinct.

In the first place, moral rules are not absolutely and universally true; they bend to circumstances.  Veracity, which is a natural duty, if there be any such, is dispensed with in case of an enemy, a thief, or a madman.  The obligation of promises is released under certain circumstances.

In the next place, the Instinct must bear with it the idea of the actions to be approved or disapproved; but we are not born with any such ideas.

On the whole, either there exist no moral instincts, or they are undistinguishable from prejudices and habits, and are not to be trusted in moral reasonings.  Aristotle held it as self-evident that barbarians are meant to be slaves; so do our modern slave-traders.  This instance is one of many to show that the convenience of the parties has much to do with the rise of a moral sentiment.  And every system built upon instincts is more likely to find excuses for existing opinions and practices than to reform either.

Again:  supposing these Instincts to exist, what is their authority or power to punish?  Is it the infliction of remorse?  That may be borne with for the pleasures and profits of wickedness.  If they are to be held as indications of the will of God, and therefore as presages of his intentions, that result may be arrived at by a surer road.

The next preliminary topic is HUMAN HAPPINESS.

Happiness is defined as the excess of pleasure over pain.  Pleasures are to be held as differing only in continuance, and in intensity.  A computation made in respect of these two properties, confirmed by the degrees of cheerfulness, tranquillity, and contentment observable among men, is to decide all questions as to human happiness.

I.—­What Human Happiness does not consist in.

Not in the pleasures of Sense, in whatever profusion or variety enjoyed; in which are included sensual pleasures, active sports, and Fine Art.

1st, Because they last for a short time. [Surely they are good for the time they do last.] 2ndly, By repetition, they lose their relish. [Intermission and variety, however, are to be supposed.] 3rdly, The eagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all others.

Paley professes to have observed in the votaries of pleasure a restless craving for variety, languor under enjoyment, and misery in the want of it.  After all, however, these pleasures have their value, and may be too much despised as well as too much followed.

Next, happiness does not consist in the exemption from pain (?), from labour, care, business, and outward evils; such exemption leaving one a prey to morbid depression, anxiety, and hypochondria.  Even a pain in moderation may be a refreshment, from giving a stimulus to pursuit.

Nor does it consist in greatness, rank, or station.  The reason here is derived, as usual, from the doctrine of Relativity or Comparison, pushed beyond all just limits.  The illustration of the dependence of the pleasure of superiority on comparison is in Paley’s happiest style.