Again, the differences of cookery among nations are much wider than the differences of moral sentiment; and yet no one denies a fundamental susceptibility to sweet and bitter.  It is not contended that we come into the world with a knowledge of actions, but that we have certain susceptibilities of emotion, in consequence of which, it is impossible for us, in after life, unless from counteracting circumstances, to be pleased with the contemplation of certain actions, and disgusted with certain other actions.  When the doctrine is thus stated, Paley’s objection, that we should also receive from nature the notions of the actions themselves, falls to the ground.  As well might we require an instinctive notion of all possible numbers, to bear out our instinctive sense of proportion.

A third limitation must be added, the influence of the principle of Association.  One way that this operates is to transfer, to a whole class of actions, the feelings peculiar to certain marked individuals.  Thus, in a civilized country, where property is largely possessed, and under complicated tenures, we become very sensitive to its violation, and acquire a proportionably intense sentiment of Justice.  Again, association operates in modifying our approval and disapproval of actions according to their attendant circumstances; as when we extenuate misconduct in a beloved person.

The author contends that, notwithstanding these limitations, we still leave unimpaired the approbation of unmixed good as good, and the disapprobation of unmixed evil as evil.  His further remarks, however, are mainly eloquent declamation on the universality of moral distinctions.

He proceeds to criticise the moral systems from Hobbes downwards.  His remarks (Lecture 76) on the province of Reason in Morality, with reference to the systems of Clarke and Wollaston, contain the gist of the matter well expressed.

He next considers the theory of Utility.  That Utility bears a certain relation to Virtue is unquestionable.  Benevolence means good to others, and virtue is of course made up, in great part, of this.  But then, if Utility is held to be the measure of virtue, standing in exact proportion to it, the proposition is very far from true; it is only a small portion of virtuous actions wherein the measure holds.

He does not doubt that virtuous actions do all tend, in a greater or less degree, to the advantage of the world.  But he considers the question to be, whether what we have alone in view, in approving certain actions, be the amount of utility that they bring; whether we have no other reason for commending a man than for praising a chest of drawers.

Consider this question first from the point of view of the agent.  Does the mother, in watching her sick infant, think of the good of mankind at that moment?  Is the pity called forth by misery a sentiment of the general good?  Look at it again from the point of view of the spectator.  Is his admiration of a steam-engine, and of an heroic human action, the same sentiment?  Why do we not worship the earth, the source of all our utilities?  The ancient worshippers of nature always gave it a soul in the first instance.