Chapter II. remarks upon the growth and peculiar advantages of Systems of Morals.  Chapter III. is on Systems of Natural Jurisprudence.  The four subsequent chapters of the Essay he states to have been composed in answer to the Ethical doctrines of Hume.

Chapter IV. enquires whether a moral action must proceed from a moral purpose in the agent.  He decides in the affirmative, replying to certain objections, and more especially to the allegation of Hume, that justice is not a natural, but an artificial virtue.  This last question is pursued at great length in Chapter V., and the author takes occasion to review the theory of Utility or Benevolence, set up by Hume as the basis of morals.  He gives Hume the credit of having made an important step in advance of the Epicurean, or Selfish, system, by including the good of others, as well as our own good, in moral acts.  Still, he demands why, if Utility and Virtue are identical, the same name should not express both.  It is true, that virtue is both agreeable and useful in the highest degree; but that circumstance does not prevent it from having a quality of its own, not arising from its being useful and agreeable, but arising from its being virtue.  The common good of society, though a pleasing object to all men, hardly ever enters into the thoughts of the great majority; and, if a regard to it were the sole motive of justice, only a select number would ever be possessed of the virtue.  The notion of justice carries inseparably along with it a notion of moral obligation; and no act can be called an act of justice unless prompted by the motive of justice.

Then, again, good music and good cookery have the merit of utility, in procuring what is agreeable both to ourselves and to society, but they have never been denominated moral virtues; so that, if Hume’s system be true, they have been very unfairly treated.

Reid illustrates his positions against Hume to a length unnecessary to follow.  The objections are exclusively and effectively aimed at the two unguarded points of the Utility system as propounded by Hume; namely, first, the not recognizing moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends; and, secondly, the not distinguishing between obligatory, and non-obligatory, useful acts.

Reid continues the controversy, with reference to Justice, in Chapter VI., on the Nature and Obligation of a Contract; and in Chapter VII. maintains, in opposition to Hume, that Moral approbation implies a Judgment of the intellect, and is not a mere feeling, as Hume seems to think.  He allows the propriety of the phrase ‘Moral Sentiment,’ because ‘Sentiment’ in English means judgment accompanied with feeling. [Hamilton dissents, and thinks that sentiment means the higher feelings.] He says, if a moral judgment be no real judgment, but only a feeling, morals have no foundation but the arbitrary structure of the mind; there are no immutable moral distinctions; and no evidence for the moral character of the Deity.