V.—­He affords little or no grounds for remarking on the connexion of Morality with Politics.  Our duties as citizens are a part of Morality, and that is all.

VI.—­He gives his views on the alliance of Ethics with Religion.  He does not admit that we should refer to the Religious sanction on all occasions.  He assumes a benevolent and all-wise Governor of the world, who will ultimately redress all inequalities, and remedy all outstanding injustice.  What this Being approves, however, is to be inferred solely from the principles of benevolence.  Our regard for him is to be shown, not by frivolous observances, sacrifices, ceremonies, and vain supplications, but by just and beneficent actions.  The author studiously ignores a revelation, and constructs for himself a Natural Religion, grounded on a benevolent and just administration of the universe.

In Smith’s Essay, the purely scientific enquiry is overlaid by practical and hortatory dissertations, and by eloquent delineations of character and of beau-ideals of virtuous conduct.  His style being thus pitched to the popular key, he never pushes home a metaphysical analysis; so that even his favourite theme, Sympathy, is not philosophically sifted to the bottom.

DAVID HARTLEY. [1705-1757.]

The ‘Observations on Man’ (1749) is the first systematic effort to explain the phenomena of mind by the Law of Association.  It contains also a philosophical hypothesis, that mental states are produced by the vibration of infinitesimal particles of the nerves.  This analogy, borrowed from the undulations of the hypothetical substance aether, has been censured as crude, and has been entirely superseded.  But, although an imperfect analogy, it nevertheless kept constantly before the mind of Hartley the double aspect of all mental phenomena, thus preventing erroneous explanations, and often suggesting correct ones.  In this respect, Aristotle and Hobbes are the only persons that can be named as equally fortunate.

The ethical remarks contained in the ‘Observations,’ relate only to the second head of summary, the Psychology of Ethics.  We shall take, first, the account of disinterestedness, and, next, of the moral sense.

1. Disinterestedness.  Under the name Sympathy, Hartley includes four kinds of feelings:—­(1) Rejoicing at the happiness of others—­Sociality, Good-will, Generosity, Gratitude; (2) Grieving for the misery of others—­Compassion, Mercy; (3) Rejoicing at the misery of others—­Anger, Jealousy, Cruelty, Malice; and (4) Grieving for the happiness of others—­Emulation, Envy.  All these feelings may be shown to originate in association.  We select as examples of Hartley’s method, Benevolence and Compassion.  Benevolence is the pleasing affection that prompts us to act for the benefit of others.  It is not a primitive feeling; but grows out of such circumstances as the following.  Almost all the pleasures, and few, in comparison, of the pains, of